Remote electronic monitoring and the landing obligation – some insights into fishers’ and fishery inspectors’ opinions by Plet-Hansen, Kristian S. et al.
 
  
 
Aalborg Universitet
Remote electronic monitoring and the landing obligation – some insights into fishers’
and fishery inspectors’ opinions
Plet-Hansen, Kristian S. ; Eliasen, Søren Qvist; Mortensen, Lars O. ; Bergsson, Heiðrikur ;
Olesen, Hans J.; Ulrich, Clara
Published in:
Marine Policy
DOI (link to publication from Publisher):
10.1016/j.marpol.2016.11.028
Creative Commons License
CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
Publication date:
2017
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Plet-Hansen, K. S., Eliasen, S. Q., Mortensen, L. O., Bergsson, H., Olesen, H. J., & Ulrich, C. (2017). Remote
electronic monitoring and the landing obligation – some insights into fishers’ and fishery inspectors’ opinions.
Marine Policy, 76, 98-106. [JMPO_2016_492]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2016.11.028
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Marine Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol
Remote electronic monitoring and the landing obligation – some insights
into fishers’ and fishery inspectors’ opinions
Kristian S. Plet-Hansena,⁎, Søren Q. Eliasenb, Lars O. Mortensena, Heiðrikur Bergssonc,
Hans J. Olesena, Clara Ulricha
a Technical University of Denmark, National Institute of Aquatic Resources (DTU Aqua), Charlottenlund Castle, DK-2920 Charlottenlund, Denmark
b Aalborg University, Department of Development and Planning, A.C. Meyers Vænge 15, DK-2450 Copenhagen SW, Denmark
c Ministry of Environment and Food of Denmark, The Danish AgriFish Agency, Nyropsgade 30, DK-1780 Copenhagen, Denmark
A R T I C L E I N F O
Keywords:
Fisheries management
Discard ban
Compliance
Fully Documented Fisheries
Fishery inspectors
Interviews
A B S T R A C T
The European fisheries management is currently undergoing a fundamental change in the handling of catches of
commercial fisheries with the implementation of the 2013 Common Fisheries Policy. One of the main objectives
of the policy is to end the practice of discarding in the EU by 2019. However, for such changes to be successful, it
is vital to ensure stakeholders acceptance, and it is prudent to consider possible means to verify compliance with
the new regulation. Remote Electronic Monitoring (REM) with Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) has been
tested in a variety of fisheries worldwide for different purposes and is currently considered as one possible tool
to ensure compliance with a European ban on discards.
This study focuses on Danish fishery inspectors and on fishers with REM experience, whose opinions are less
well known. Their views on the landing obligation and on the use of REM were investigated using interviews and
questionnaires, and contrasted to some fishers without REM experience. 80% of fishery inspectors and 58% of
REM-experienced fishers expressed positive views on REM. 9 out of 10 interviewed fishers without REM
experience were against REM. Participation in a REM trial has not led to antipathy towards REM. Fishery
inspectors saw on-board observers, at-sea control and REM as the three best solutions to control the landing
obligation but shared the general belief that the landing obligation cannot be enforced properly and will be
difficult for fishers to comply with. The strengths and weaknesses of REM in this context are discussed.
1. Introduction
The pressure for a change in fishing practices in the European
Union (EU) increased throughout the 2000s, not least due to public
demand like the Fish Fight campaign that demanded the end of
discarding in the EU [1–4]. Discards are the part of the catch that is
returned to the sea [5]. The public and environmental NGOs perceive
discarding as unsustainable, unethical and a waste of resources, which
has led to attempts to limit or end the practice [4,6–9]. Measures for
this include increased gear selectivity, effort restrictions, quota limita-
tions, temporal and spatial restrictions, transferability of quotas and
discard bans [3,10,11]. Discard bans have been in place in Iceland
since 1977, in Norway since 1983 and at the Faroe Islands since 1994
[11,12]. With the entry into force of the landing obligation of the 2013
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) a discard ban is now also being
implemented in the EU [13]. Banning discards is meant to ensure that
total catches do not exceed the threshold defined by the regulatory
framework (e.g. Maximum Sustainable Yield, MSY). Compliance with
the landing obligation therefore requires a Catch Quota Management
scheme (CQM) that aims at managing both wanted and unwanted
catches. Documentation of all catches is thus required to verify CQM, a
concept referred to as Fully Documented Fisheries (FDF) [4,14,15].
Measures to conduct FDF include self-sampling, reference fleets, on-
board observers and Remote Electronic Monitoring (REM) with
Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) [16]. The use of REM with CCTV,
henceforth referred to as REM in this paper, as a tool to obtain FDF has
been tested in a number of countries, including Canada, the US,
Australia, New Zealand, Denmark, the UK, the Netherlands and
Germany [14,15,17–31]. Ongoing technological developments are
taking place to increase the reliability, the cost-efficiency and the
scientific added-value of the data collected by REM [23,32]. The
primary reservation against REM has however not been on data
validity but on the ethical dilemma as to whether the surveillance level
imposed by such a measure is acceptable [3,16,33]. A study among UK
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fishers showed that REM was seen as an intrusion and that fishers had
concerns on whether video footage could be used to discredit the
fisheries [16]. The authors also investigated which incentives could
mitigate the perceived nuisance and encourage participation in FDF,
with direct payment and additional quota scoring highest [16]. Much
less known are the views among another primary group of REM users,
the fishery inspectors in charge of enforcing the regulations imposed on
the fisheries. The nature of their work and their day-to-day interactions
with fishers provide fishery inspectors with experience and detailed
understanding of regulations and of practical issues in the fisheries, but
little attempt has been made so far to collect their knowledge and
integrate it into the design of the fishery policy. Accordingly, this study
investigates the opinions of Danish fishery inspectors’ on the use of
REM as a measure for control, monitoring and surveillance (MCS) and
on their expectations for the landing obligation, in order to assess
whether coercive measures are likely to be needed to ensure compli-
ance with the landing obligation. A similar investigation among some
Danish fishers is also conducted, including both fishers with and
without REM experience, in order to contrast the results. The main
driver for fishers is to ensure profits through the harvest of fish stocks
whereas fishery inspectors’ main objective is to enforce fishery regula-
tions: Hence, it is expected that the perception on the meaningfulness
and the viability of different regulations as well as on the practical
obstacles imposed by these regulations may vary between these two
groups of stakeholders. This article therefore aims at highlighting
specific areas of convergence or divergence of perceptions between
fishery inspectors and fishers.
2. Material and methods
2.1. Questionnaires for fishery inspectors
The Danish fisheries control is organised as part of the Danish
AgriFish Agency under the Ministry of Environment and Food of
Denmark. The fisheries control is organised with the central office
placed in the capital, seven departments with a permanent staff and
three control vessels [34,35]. The collaborators at the Danish fisheries
control stated that they preferred a questionnaire to semi-structured
interviews and believed that a higher proportion of responses would be
obtained if the fishery inspectors received and responded to the
questionnaire by email rather than if they were contacted in person
or by telephone. A questionnaire covering 16 questions and intended to
take approximately 10 min to complete was therefore developed. The
majority of the questions were open-ended questions, except for
questions relating to the ranking of MCS measures and positive/
negative effects on the marine environment and fisheries, which were
close-ended, though with possibility for a follow-up explanation. Prior
to distribution, the questionnaire was tested and revised with a Senior
Fisheries Officer from the Danish AgriFish Agency experienced with the
use of REM in the fisheries control. A Chief Officer distributed the
questionnaire by email to all sections in the Danish fisheries control.
The Danish fisheries control head office in Copenhagen did not actively
encourage fishery inspectors to respond to the questionnaire but knew
of it and permitted the survey. Respondents returned the filled
questionnaire by email to the Chief Officer who collected and for-
warded the questionnaires. Respondents were thereby anonymous to
the author of this article but not to the Chief Officer. On two occasions,
the Chief Officer sent reminders to departments from where no
responses had been received after three months. In total, these
reminders led to four additional respondents. Based on the diverse
answers from the respondents (see Section 2.2) this central collection is
not expected to have influenced the answers from the respondents.
2.2. Fishery inspectors’ representation
The total number of relevant fishery inspectors in Denmark was 95
at the time of writing. 30 fishery inspectors filled in and returned the
questionnaire, corresponding to 31.6% of Danish fishery inspectors.
Respondents came from the central office in Copenhagen, from six out
of seven regional departments and from two out of three control vessels
Fig. 1. Permanently manned fisheries control departments in Denmark. Black dots represent departments from where responses to the questionnaire were obtained, seven in total. Red
dots represent departments where no responses to the questionnaire were obtained, one in total.
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(Fig. 1).
Out of the 30 respondents, 21 had experience with REM (Table 1).
Of these 21, nine had encountered REM while undertaking an
inspection of a vessel, implying that these fishery inspectors have seen
but not engaged in the use of a REM system. Eight of the 21 had
changed hard drives on vessels participating in a trial using REM.
Three of the 21 had viewed some of the video footage recorded by a
REM system. One of the 21 had participated in the drafting and
implementation of regulations in connection with the usage of REM.
Various trials on REM have been conducted in Denmark since 2008
[14,15,28,29] and some were still in operation at the time of writing.
There has thus been ample time for fishery inspectors to encounter a
vessel with REM. It is therefore not seen as a bias that 70% of
responding fishery inspectors has encountered REM in some way.
2.3. Interviews with fishers
A total of 22 interviews with fishers were conducted between 7
September and 9 November 2015 based on questions similar to those
in the questionnaire distributed to the fishery inspectors but including
questions related to practical fishing issues and to specific experiences
with REM trials when relevant. Questions related to opinions on the
effects of the landing obligation and REM was the same for fishers as
for fishery inspectors. Of the 22 interviews, 14 were conducted at the
24th International Fisheries Exhibition, DanFish, in Aalborg, Denmark
from 7 to 9 September 2015. During the exhibition, 43 fishers were
approached with 14 willing to be interviewed. This exhibition was
chosen as the main place for interviewing fishers because it provided an
opportunity to contact a large number of fishers within a short time
frame. Additionally, it was expected that fishers attending the exhibi-
tion would be more likely to take the time to be interviewed without
prior arrangements because they would not be influenced by external
factors like good or bad fishing weather. However, collecting interview
data at the DanFish exhibition limited the sampling frame to fishers
who were attending the exhibition, including only a small number of
fishers with REM experience. Therefore, eight additional interviews
were conducted by telephone from 14 October to 9 November 2015.
Fishers interviewed by telephone had given their contact information
and declared their willingness to participate in a telephone interview
during a local meeting on the use of REM held on 18 August 2015.
Present at the meeting were representatives from the Danish AgriFish
Agency, DTU Aqua, the Danish Fishermen's Association and local
fishers – mainly skippers - in Hanstholm, Denmark. This prearranged
possibility for future interviews allowed for an extension of the data
gathered from fishers’ interviews, including more responses from
REM-experienced fishers. Incidentally, it cannot be excluded that there
is a bias in the data arising from differences between face-to-face and
telephone interviews, even though the questions were the same.
Interview time ranged between 30 and 45 min for both interviews
conducted face-to-face or by telephone. Difference in length of inter-
views mainly depended on the number and length of explanations
made by fishers to clarify their responses.
2.4. Fishers’ representation
A total of 22 fishers were interviewed. Of these, 12 had experience
with REM by being participants in Danish REM trials, and 10 had no
experience with REM (Table 2).
By coincidence, the fishers without REM experience interviewed at
the exhibition represented a more diverse part of the Danish fishing
industry in terms of gear type, target species and area than the
interviewed REM-experienced fishers, who were all operating demersal
trawlers in the North Sea and Skagerrak. The largest and longest
running Danish trial on REM is the Cod Catch Quota Management trial
which started in 2010 [14,15]. Although some Danish seiners and
gillnetters have participated in this trial, the majority of vessels have
been trawlers [14]. The incentives to participate in this trial – a 30%
increase in cod quota - has been criticised for potentially selecting for
demersal trawlers with substantial cod quota [36], emphasising the
importance of keeping in mind that other REM-experienced fishers
using other gear types like gillnet, longline, pelagic trawl or seine may
have different views than those expressed here. In all, interviewed
REM-experienced fishers represented 29.0% of all Danish vessels
participating in all REM trials and 50.0% of Danish REM trawlers.
2.5. Data handling
Responses from fishery inspectors were compiled manually after
Table 1
Diversity in geography and job title among responding fishery inspectors depending on
REM-experience.
REM-experienced fishery
inspectors, n=21
Non-REM-experienced
fishery inspectors, n=9
Department Control vessel
“Vestkysten” (n=6)
Control vessel “Vestkysten”
(n=2)
Control vessel “Havørnen”
(n=1)
Control vessel “Havørnen”
(n=1)
Fredericia (n=4) Fredericia (n=1)
Nykøbing Mors (n=4) Ringsted (n=1)
Hvide Sande (n=2) Hvide Sande (n=1)
Rønne (n= 1) Randers (n=1)
Copenhagen (n=1) Control vessel, unspecified
(n=1)
Department not specified
(n=2)
Department not specified
(n=1)
Title Fishery inspector (n=10) Fishery inspector (n=3)
Vice fishery inspector
(n=1)
Senior fisheries officer
(n=1)
Senior fisheries officer
(n=1)
Master mariner (n= 2)
Master mariner (n= 3) First mate (n=2)
Chief Officer (n=3) Title not specified (n=1)
First mate (n=2)
Title not specified (n=1)
Type of REM
experience
At-sea control on a vessel
with REM (n=9)
None (n=9)
Changed REM hard drives
on vessels (n=8)
Reviewed video footage
(n=3)
Drafted terms for REM
trials (n=1)
Table 2
Gear type, fishing area, job title and target species of interviewed fishers.
REM-experienced fishers, n=12 Non-REM-experienced
fishers, n=10
Gear types Trawl (n=12) Danish seiner (n=1)
Trawl (n=3)
Industrial trawl (n=2)
Gillnet (n=4)
Main fishing
area
The North Sea (n=12) Skagerrak (n=5)
The North Sea (n=3)
Kattegat (n=2)
Main target
species
Mixed demersal, mainly Nephrops,
plaice, cod, saithe, haddock and hake
(n=12)
Plaice and cod (n=1)
Cod, haddock, whiting
and saithe (n=1)
Sprat and sandeel (n=2)
Nephrops (n=2)
Cod, plaice, sole, hake
and saithe (n=4)
Title Skipper (n=9) Skipper (n=6)
Crew (n=3) Crew (n=4)
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collection. Responses to close-ended questions were easily compiled
whereas responses to open-ended questions had to be categorised in
order to compare responses. Response categories were developed and
fitted empirically in order to highlight the main points while avoiding
removing important nuances. Although great care has been given to
this process, it cannot be fully ruled out that the inherent interpretation
taking place in such a categorising may reduce the scope of the
collected data.
Responses from fishers were also categorised manually but as
fishers’ responses came during a live conversation, the interviewer's
interpretation and categorisation of the responses were read to the
fisher who could then acknowledge or reject and elaborate on the
response. This check on responses was done during the interview to
avoid misunderstandings.
As the respondents from both the fishery inspectors’ group and the
REM-experienced fishers’ group represented at least 30% of their
group, their responses were considered sufficiently representative to
be treated quantitatively. The ten fishers without REM experience are a
heterogeneous group and represent less than 0.5‰ of the approxi-
mately 4800 registered fishers in Denmark [37]. As such, their
responses cannot be considered representative for all fishers in
Denmark without REM experience but are included to extend and
contrast views.
3. Results
3.1. Fishery inspectors’ views on REM
In all, 80% of the interviewed fishery inspectors could say some-
thing positive about REM (Table 3), primarily pointing out its potential
for full documentation and compliance with discard regulations (63%).
However, 20% of fishery inspectors did not see any benefits in REM.
Concerns on the use of REM revolved around the possibility to bypass
the cameras, because REM is presented as a tool for full documenta-
tion, which almost 23% of the fishery inspectors did not believe REM
will allow for. Additionally, the surveillance level was seen as an
intrusion by 27% of the fishery inspectors.
In general, 17% of the fishery inspectors were against REM but with
40% of fishery inspectors being for the use of REM and 43% being
undecided, the majority of fishery inspectors did not oppose REM as a
MCS measure.
The fishery inspectors then ranked seven MCS measures (Table 4).
Fishery inspectors could add other MCS measures in a subsequent
open-ended question but the respondents proposed no other measures.
Four of the 30 respondents completed the ranking in a wrong manner
by giving the same score to several MCS measures or leaving blank
cells. The scoring from these four respondents was excluded.
3.2. Fishery inspectors view on the landing obligation
More than 80% of the 30 fishery inspectors stated that enforcing the
landing obligation was the main challenge as they did not see how it
would be possible to control and thereby enforce the landing obligation
(Table 5).
Most fishery inspectors were unsure whether the landing obligation
would have a positive effect on the marine environment, but did not
believe either that it may have a negative impact (Table 6).
The potential positive reasons given were the reduction in fishing
mortality and the increase in selectivity if discarding ends. The negative
reasons were non-compliance with the regulation or that the end of
discarding would lead to a loss of available food sources among marine
organisms which in turn may lead to a lower production. Additionally,
fishery inspectors were asked on the positive and the negative effects of
the landing obligation on the Danish fisheries (Table 7).
The potential positive reasons were a better public image and
increased quota when discards were no longer included in the stock
assessments.
The negative reasons were the increased complexity in regulations
and the inherent mismatch between a continuation of the current quota
system and a discard ban where choke species, increased handling time
and shortage of storage space were mentioned as issues.
Table 3
The positive, negative and overall opinion on REM, fishery inspectors.
Fishery inspectors
(n=30)
Questions Answers N %
Can you say something
positive on REM with
CCTV? (open ended
question)
Should allow for full
documentation
10 33.3
Should ensure compliance
with discard regulations
9 30.0
No 6 20.0
Has a preventive effect 3 10.0
Can be expanded to form a
reference fleet
1 3.3
Relatively cheap control
measure
1 3.3
Can you say something
negative on REM with
CCTV? (open ended
question)
Can be bypassed for instance
due to blind spots
8 26.7
The surveillance level is an
intrusion.
8 26.7
It is not full documentation
but people think it is
7 23.3
Insufficient as the sole
control measure
3 10.0
Expensive 2 6.7
Vulnerable to smudge or
water droplets on the camera
lenses
2 6.7
Are you generally for or
against the use of REM
with CCTV?
For 12 40.0
Against 5 16.7
Neither for nor against 13 43.3
Table 4
Average and median ranking for seven MCS measures, n=26.
MCS measure Average rank Median rank Lowest rank Highest ranka
On-board observer 2.1 1 7 1
At-sea control 2.3 3 4 1
REM with CCTV 3.2 3 6 1
Reference fleet 4.1 4 7 1
Control of landings 4.7 4 7 2
Logbook 5.4 5 7 3
Genetic control 5.8 6 7 2
The highest possible rank was 1, lowest possible rank was 7. Six of the 26 respondents
were unfamiliar with genetic control. Two of the 26 respondents were unfamiliar with
reference fleets as a MCS measure. All 26 respondents gave a score for on-board
observers, at-sea control, REM, control of landings and logbooks.
a Lowest and highest rank refer to the lowest and highest rank given by any
respondent.
Table 5
Challenges for the fishery control with the landing obligation.
Fishery inspectors
(n=30)
Question Answers N %
What do you see as the primary
challenge regarding the
landing obligation, for the
fisheries control? (open ended
question)
Enforcing the landing
obligation
25 83.3
Getting the fishers to
see why the landing
obligation is
meaningful
3 10.0
No new challenges 1 3.3
Did not answer 1 3.3
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3.3. Fishers’ opinion on REM
Fishers’ were asked the same questions on REM as fishery
inspectors (Table 8).
All interviewed fishers who had participated in a REM trial could
state something positive about the concept, mainly pointing to quota
uplift, public goodwill and more sustainable fisheries. This is in
contrast to the interviewed fishers without REM experience where
the majority did not have anything positive to say regarding REM. As
one non-REM experienced fisher responded: “No. It is a waste of time
and gives no results for the stocks”.
The issues with REM most frequently mentioned by REM-experi-
enced fishers were the constant surveillance first, and as second the fact
that all European vessels should carry REM. The current use of REM
does not match well with “an equal playing field” if not all EU vessels
have a REM system installed. The surveillance level was also the main
issue raised by non-REM-experienced fishers but even though the issue
was the same, non-REM-experienced fishers expressed their disap-
proval in stronger wordings than REM-experienced fishers, with a
tendency to emphasise that they perceived REM as a criminalisation of
the fishing industry. As one non-REM-experienced fisher put it: “It is
idiotic! Are fishers criminals? ”.
Non-REM-experienced fishers also criticised REM for being a waste
of time that can be misused to discredit the industry and a few stated
that the trials are skewed and therefore cannot be used for anything.
Specific criticisms of the trial setups were also pointed out as issues
among REM-experienced fishers, such as an inadequate feedback on
trial results. One REM-experienced fisher came with possibly the one
response that best illustrate that some REM-experienced fishers do not
perceive major issues with REM, simply responding in a humoristic
manner that the main negative aspect of REM was that they could no
longer high-grade.
Except for one who was undecided, all interviewed non-REM-
experienced fishers were against the use of REM, whereas the majority
of interviewed REM-experienced fishers were for the use of REM.
However, some sort of reward should accompany the REM system
(Table 9). As a REM-experienced fisher put it: “If it was up to me
everyone should have REM on-board. But we want something for
having cameras on-board.”
Quota uplifts were clearly favoured as a compensation for REM,
although the possibility to store bycatch as ensilage and less technical
rules (free gear choice) were mentioned as well by REM-experienced
fishers. In contrast, no non-REM-experienced fishers would take REM
on if free selection of gear was the only reward. Although some non-
REM-experienced fishers were willing to take on REM if this was
accompanied by a quota uplift, other non-REM-experienced fishers
were quite passionate in stating that no reward could ever mitigate the
nuisance of having REM on-board. Quoting one of these respondents:
“The question is not relevant. A quota increase cannot be great
enough for me to be willing to sell my soul”.
3.4. Fishers’ opinion on the landing obligation
Interviewed fishers were generally quite negative in their opinion
Table 6
Effect of the landing obligation on the marine environment.
Fishery inspectors
(n=30)
Questions Answers N %
Do you believe that the landing obligation
will have a positive effect on the
marine environment?
Yes 10 33.3
No 7 23.3
Do not know 13 43.3
Do you believe that the landing obligation
will have a negative effect on the
marine environment?
Yes 1 3.3
No 19 63.3
Do not know 10 33.3
Table 7
Effect of the landing obligation on the Danish fisheries.
Fishery inspectors
(n=30)
Questions Answers N %
Do you believe that the landing obligation
will have a positive effect on the
Danish fisheries?
Yes 13 43.3
No 11 36.7
Do not know 6 20.0
Do you believe that the landing obligation
will have a negative effect on the
Danish fisheries?
Yes 9 30.0
No 13 43.3
Do not know 8 26.7
Table 8
The positive, negative and overall opinion on REM, fishers’ responses.
REM-
experienced
fishers (n=12)
Non-REM-
experienced
fishers (n=10)
Questions Answers N % N %
Can you say
something
positive
about REM
with CCTV?
(open
ended
question)
Quota increase 5 41.7 1 10.0
No/Nothing 0 0.0 6 60.0
Increase in public
goodwill/image
improvement
3 25.0 0 0.0
Induce adaptions for
more sustainable
fisheries
3 25.0 0 0.0
REM can catch those
who cheat
0 0.0 3 30.0
Better stock assessment 1 8.3 0 0.0
Can you say
something
negative
about REM
with CCTV?
(open
ended
question)
Surveillance is a
criminalisation of the
industry
0 0.0 4 40.0
Constant surveillance 4 33.3 0 0.0
Nothing particular but
should apply to all
European vessels
3 25.0 0 0.0
REM trials are skewed
since extra cod quota
changes the target
species for participants
0 0.0 2 20.0
REM is waste of time
with no actual effect
0 0.0 2 20.0
Video footage can be
misused
0 0.0 1 10.0
Inadequate feedback
from REM project
1 8.3 0 0.0
Too expensive since
extra quota have been
necessary to be bought
due to regulations on
CQM
1 8.3 0 0.0
Result of
micromanagement
which is harsh for the
fishing industry
compared to the
agricultural sector
1 8.3 0 0.0
Vessels participating in
REM trials have become
dependent on the extra
quota
1 8.3 0 0.0
We can’t high-grade 1 8.3 0 0.0
No 0 0.0 1 10.0
Are you
generally
for or
against the
use of REM
with CCTV?
For 7 58.3 0 0.0
Against 4 33.3 9 90.0
Undecided 1 8.3 1 10.0
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on the landing obligation. Fishers did not only fear the economic
profitability of their sector after the introduction of the landing
obligation; they were also largely confused and felt harassed stating
that they expected an increase in bureaucracy with incoherent regula-
tions as a result. As one non-REM-experienced fisher stated: “We don’t
know what is going on. There is no description. We are not allowed to
land it (the catch, red.) and we are not allowed to discard. What do
they want us to do with it?”.
Some of the responding REM-experienced fishers were less worried
of the impact of the regulation, with one respondent stating to a
question on whether they had done or would make any specific
preparation prior to the implementation of the landing obligation for
their fishery: “No. We have nothing to hide and can handle it”.
However, the majority of interviewed fishers, regardless of gear or
experience with REM, believed that the landing obligation would have
a negative effect on the Danish fisheries due to issues with choke
species, storage space, handling time, quota settings and marketing. All
these issues were believed to hamper the economic sustainability of the
fisheries. Additionally, hardly any interviewed fisher (1 out of 22)
believed the landing obligation would have a positive effect on the
marine environment. Indeed, the majority of interviewed fishers
believed that rather than improving the status of the marine environ-
ment, the landing obligation would be damaging to the marine
environment (15 out of 22). Reasons given for this were the increased
mortality for fish that would have survived discarding (but will be taken
ashore with the landing obligation) and the decrease in available food
sources for organisms that feed on discards, be it seabirds, other fish or
benthic organisms. A few other responding fishers (6 out 22) did not
see the landing obligation as having neither a negative nor a positive
effect. These respondents see the landing obligation as indifferent.
Quoting one of these respondents, an industrial trawl fisher who had
already been operating under the landing obligation for almost one
year: “It (the landing obligation red.) is just another type of doc-
umentation. The fishing practice is not changed as such.”
4. Discussion
4.1. Opinions on REM
The practical knowledge on REM was not homogenous among
responding fishery inspectors as almost one third had no REM
experience and another third had only encountered REM while
performing at-sea control on a REM vessel. Only four out of the 30
responding fishery inspectors had actually reviewed video footage from
REM systems. This does not mean that the take on REM is unim-
portant for the majority of fishery inspectors but it should be kept in
mind that most of the fishery inspectors have little if any practical
experience with REM and therefore may have been influenced in their
beliefs from talks on REM with co-workers or fishers.
Among fishery inspectors, the possibility to cheat REM by bypass-
ing the CCTV field of view was widely seen as a downside with this
system, not least on the basis that REM is presented as being a reliable
tool for achieving full documentation. The other major issue perceived
with the use of REM is the intrusiveness of cameras. The risk of
smudge sticking to camera lenses and the cost of operating a fisheries
monitored by REM were also raised as issues, although, other fishery
inspectors pointed to the opposite opinions arguing for the lower cost
and better level of control as the possible gains from REM. This
suggests either quite divergent perceptions of the outcomes of the
Danish trials on REM among fishery inspectors in Denmark or that the
questionnaire setup has increased the divergence on the subject.
Because the opinion on REM was investigated both with a question
on the positive and a question on the negative aspects of REM in the
questionnaire, this could have led to positive and negative responses on
REM from respondents who may have only stated a positive or negative
aspect if responding to a single open-ended question on their general
opinion on REM.
Globally, fishery inspectors viewed at-sea control and on-board
observers as superior MCS tools compared to REM, but only at-sea
control had a low spread in the scoring between the individual fishery
inspectors indicating high convergence. The positive opinion on at-sea
control might however be somewhat influenced by the respondents,
since several responding fishery inspectors perform at-sea control in
their daily work and thereby might be inclined to favour this measure.
Despite this, REM was ranked as the third best option out of seven
possible, had the same median ranking as at-sea control and scored a
top ranking among several of the respondents. The overall opinion on
REM among fishery inspectors is thus quite divergent. One in six
fishery inspectors stated they are against the use of REM and two
almost equally large groups were either “for” or “neither for nor
against” the use of video documentation. It may be kept in mind that
the large group of fishery inspectors who stated “neither for nor
against” to the question on their general opinion towards REM, may
be influenced in their response by their position as government
officials. Because the final decision on the use of REM is political,
some responders may find it inappropriate to take position for or
against this MCS measure. This could also explain why six fishery
inspectors had nothing positive to say about REM whereas five stated
they were against the measure. The political opinion has previously
been in favour of REM in Denmark [38,39], however the current
administration has not been clear in its support of REM.
Interviewed fishers in favour of REM added that a reward should
accompany the REM system, and pointed to quota uplifts as the
preferred option. The fact that Danish trials on REM has been
voluntary and have been conducted mainly with a quota premium as
the reward may have influenced the views of REM-experienced fishers.
The responses are however in line with the report by Hedley et al.
(2015) that stated that due to the voluntary nature of the trials using
REM it is difficult to infer how REM would work if it would become
compulsory for all vessels, with no quota premium given as compensa-
tion [8]. While none of the non-REM-experienced fishers were
supportive of the use of REM, it is worth noting that the majority of
REM-experienced fishers were supportive of it. Based on this study it
cannot be inferred whether these fishers were positive towards REM as
a MCS measure before they started in a REM trial. However, it can be
said that participation in a REM trial has not led to a general antipathy
towards the measure.
Table 9
Fishers’ willingness to take on REM depending on the accompanying benefit.
REM-experienced
fishers (n=12)
Non-REM-
experienced fishers
(n=10)
Questions Answers N % N %
If REM gave the right
to free selection of
fishing gears,
would you then
take cameras on
board?
Yes 2 16.7 0 0.0
No 8 66.7 10 100.0
Did not
answer
2 16.7 0 0.0
If REM gave an
increase in quota,
how large would
such an increase
have to be for you
to take cameras on
board?
20% 2 16.7 0 0.0
30% 7 58.3 4 40.0
100% 0 0.0 1 10.0
No quota
increase
could be
large enough
1 8.3 4 40.0
Did not
answer
2 16.7 1 10.0
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4.2. Opinions on the landing obligation
The majority of responding fishery inspectors stated that the largest
challenge for the fishery control with the landing obligation will be to
actually enforce the regulation. Current Danish fishery control uses at-
sea control, landings control and self-reported catches in the electronic
logbook to perform a risk-based management [40,41]. With the
majority of fishery inspectors fearing that the landing obligation cannot
be enforced properly, it seems that these methods are believed to be
insufficient as tools to verify total catches and not just landings. Though
the majority of responding fishery inspectors believed the landing
obligation will have a positive effect on the marine environment, a large
group of respondents were nevertheless doubtful as to what will
happen. Concerns were raised on the impact of removing the “free”
food source that discards act as. Fishery inspectors were less certain as
to whether this effect will be negative for the ecosystem than the
responding fishers were. The true ecological effect of removing discards
is unclear. Some studies have pointed to the reduced food availability
as a potential negative effect of reduced discards, especially for seabird
populations and primary scavengers [42–44], although the actual
effects up the food chain and in the long-term effects are uncertain
but likely limited [4,45]. The effect of reducing the food source from
discards depend on several factors and the potential increase in
selectivity and reduced fishing mortality are likely to mean a net
positive effect on fish stocks [42,43].
Regarding the effect on fisheries, a third of fishery inspectors
expressed confidence in the adaptability of the industry and the effect
of a better public image, but another third of them believed the landing
obligation will have a negative effect on the Danish fisheries, mainly
due to increased complexity and mismatch in regulations.
The notable resentment towards the landing obligation among
responding fishers together with the fishery inspectors’ disbelief in a
viable control and enforcement of the regulation raise concerns.
Compliance behaviour among fishers has been found to be influenced
by whether regulations are seen as meaningful and legitimate [46–48].
In an earlier Danish study, it was found that if fishers begin to violate
regulations, it can create a shift in the attitude towards a regulation,
were non-compliance may become the norm rather than the exception
[47]. Interestingly, that study reported fishers to find it morally wrong
to discard catches that are dead [47], whereas this ethical aspect did
not appear strongly in the present interviews.
No difference in the attitude towards the landing obligation based
on gear, target species or fishing area was presented in this study
because no such difference was found. One might have expected to see
a lower resentment towards the landing obligation among fisheries
with a high selectivity, like gillnetters. However, that this is not seen in
this study may both be due to the low number of responding fishers
using gillnet and the general uncertainty among fishers as to how the
landing obligation will be when it is fully implemented.
4.3. REM and the landing obligation
Based on the responses regarding the landing obligation there
seems to be a need for MCS measures if compliance is to be ensured.
Article 15 in the 2013 CFP state that:
“For the purpose of monitoring compliance with the landing
obligation, Member States shall ensure detailed and accurate
documentation of all fishing trips and adequate capacity and
means, such as observers, closed-circuit television (CCTV) and
others. In doing so, Member States shall respect the principle of
efficiency and proportionality.” [13].
Looking at the more technical criticism raised by responders in the
present study, the shortcomings portrayed for REM focused on the cost
of running a REM system, malfunctions and that the system does not
truly ensure full documentation. All of these points are valid, but
should be kept in comparison with the alternative MCS measures. The
workload and thereby cost of auditing video footage can be reduced by
doing samples, as has been the case in the Danish Cod Catch Quota
Management trial [14,49]. Hereby a certain percentage of the total
video footage is reviewed. This percentage can be lowered or increased
depending on factors like available funds and the level of control
deemed adequate. If non-compliance or suspicious behaviour occur in
the sampled footage, the amount of reviewed data can be increased to
comprehensively document potential non-compliance. Fitting REM
onto vessels and recording all fishing activities does not automatically
mean reviewing all the video footage. It is therefore more accurate to
compare the level of control with those obtained with current control
measures, like at-sea control and on-board observers. With such a
comparison both the cost and the workload involved in reviewing video
footage seems less cumbersome and is likely to be cheaper
[15,16,23,50]. Additionally, because of the random selection proce-
dures often used in REM trials, the fishers do not know which footage
will be selected for review. This mean that although only a certain
percentage of the video footage is reviewed, essentially REM allow for
100% monitoring coverage of fishing activities which would be very
costly to obtain with on-board observers [14,16,23].
Finally, the technology is in constant development, and there are
great potentials for achieving full review of all video footage in the
future using automated image analysis [23,32]. The technology is
nowadays still vulnerable to dirt on camera lenses, distortions in the
field of video view and periods where large quantities of fish occur on
the discard belt [32]. However, further development may enable video
audit to be done mainly by computer software, supported by trained
personnel in order to determine the course of action when the
computer software is unable to distinguish or if malfunctions occur.
The possibility to bypass REM and practice non-compliance cannot
be dismissed. However, this is also true for other MCS measures like at-
sea control or landings control, because these measures only allow for
limited or no presence during the handling of catches at sea. For a
given haul, using on-board observers is likely to ensure better data and
a higher degree of full documentation than REM, because observers
can perform additional measurements, which are not possible with a
video system, and observers are less likely to be affected by blind spots
during catch processing [16]. Discrepancies between observers, fishers
estimates and REM data may still occur, especially when the quantities
observed are small [14,24]. The reasons for these discrepancies must
be carefully investigated and the estimation protocols adapted if
necessary. Nevertheless, it must be noted that in many cases, these
discrepancies lead to uncertain but not necessarily biased estimates
[14,24]. While it might always be possible to bypass a REM system, it
may also be relevant to speculate whether and when it is profitable for a
fisher to bypass the system? If the perceived effort to bypass the MCS
measure is greater than the perceived gain from non-compliance, it
would make more sense simply to comply with the regulation. In the
Danish Cod Catch Quota Management trials, self-sampling estimates
were often higher than estimates from video audit, even though the
reported discards were deduced from the quota [14,51] This could
indicate that compliance was generally perceived as more beneficial
than non-compliance. If so, self-sampling verified by REM has fulfilled
its purpose, regardless of whether the REM system can be bypassed or
not.
Possibly the largest reservation against the use of REM is the ethical
dilemma it presents. The strong resentment towards the surveillance
level is the main weakness of REM [3,16]. Rather than making REM
compulsory it may be easier to establish a voluntary reference fleet
where self-reported catches are verified by REM. As in the Norwegian
reference fleet, the benefit for vessels could be quota uplifts [16].
Alternatively, it has been suggested to use a quid-pro-quo approach
where fishers who agree to have a high level of MCS that allow for
accurate catch data are rewarded with higher quotas than fishers who
chose to be under less extensive MCS [52]. The logic behind is that it
K.S. Plet-Hansen et al. Marine Policy 76 (2017) 98–106
104
should count in one's favour to provide accurate catch data whereas
those not willing to provide accurate catch data are assumed to
continue with a certain level of discarding which is then reflected in
their quota. The actual use and ownership of video footage may also
improve fishers’ opinion on REM. Using the practice for trucks’ black
boxes as a model, clear division and rules underlining that fishers has
the ownership of REM data would minimise the risk of third parties
getting hold of video footage and use it to discredit the fishing industry,
an issue which fishers pointed to both in this survey and in a UK study
[16]. For MCS purposes, the fisheries control authorities could ask for
video documentation by the fisher in question in cases where non-
compliance were suspected, thus reversing the burden of proof and
bringing the responsibility back to the fishers.
If REM is ruled out as a MCS measure, it will be necessary to ensure
compliance by some other mean. Creating economic incentives that
make rule compliance more favourable than non-compliance might be
possible, e.g. by utilization of fish below the Minimum Conservation
Reference Size [42]. However, this approach is a delicate balance,
because the possible profit gained from utilization has to be at level
where it does not counteract the incentive for good gear selectivity
[4,42,44]. The use of on-board observers has the potential to ensure
compliance with the landing obligation, but the extent of such a MCS
measure is likely to be very costly. Additionally, making on-board
observers mandatory may also be seen as an intrusion just like the use
of REM. In the North Pacific, McElderry reported REM monitored
fishers to prefer REM over on-board observers as the presence of
cameras were seen as less intrusive [53].
5. Conclusion
The responses from interviews and questionnaires point to great
uncertainties regarding the perceived effects of the landing obligation
and whether the landing obligation will be complied with. Not only
does it appear that the regulation is often not perceived as meaningful
in the Danish fishery community, it is also largely seen as impossible to
enforce by the fishery inspectors. This mistrust will clearly be a major
hindrance to the full implementation of the landing obligation. The use
of REM is considered as a mean to ensure compliance and to document
whether fishers exploit the marine resources in a sustainable manner.
However, the mandatory use of REM is likely to be met with opposition
from the fishing community. On the other hand, it is worth noting that
the majority of fishers who had participated in a REM trial did not
display strong antipathy against REM. In addition, the majority of
fishery inspectors believe that the landing obligation cannot be
enforced properly, meaning that the current methods of at-sea and
at-port control are perceived as inadequate for the control of total
catches. The mandatory use of on-board observers will likely be very
costly, and may neither be considered positively by the fishing
community. In parallel with extending and enhancing MCS measures,
it is therefore crucial to design incentives for compliance [9]. There are
many different approaches and combinations of MCS measures, which
could come into play as means to verify compliance with the landing
obligation [8,11,33], and different options might be suitable in
different fisheries. In the frame of the increased regionalisation framed
by the 2013 CFP, increased dialogue between managers, fishers,
controllers and scientists is taking place within each Member State,
hopefully paving a way for future fisheries management that is both
legitimate and effective.
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